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The Vocal Euro-outsider: The UK in a Two-
speed Europe
REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN
Abstract
The EU is divided between member states that have adopted the euro and those that have
not. This article looks at the issue of differentiated integration with particular reference to
eurozone integration and the euro-outsiders. I explore the recent public debate in the UK on
euro-outsiderness, comparing this with debates in Denmark. The article highlights some
striking differences between the UK and Denmark when it comes to the actual management
of euro-outsiderness in Brussels as well as some of the dilemmas facing euro-outsiders such
as the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Poland as the EU struggles to exit its crises. Finally, I dis-
cuss the future of two-speed European integration and the UK’s possible exit from the EU.
The UK cannot escape the dilemma of favouring either inﬂuence or autonomy; whether the
UK remains in or leaves the EU, it will need to allow the eurozone to proceed in order to
prevent further eurozone crises.
Keywords: Brexit, differentiated integration, eurozone, euro-outsider, opt-out, UK
Introduction
TODAY, VERY few would question the UK’s
euro-outsiderness. If nothing else, the lack of
economic growth and debt problems in the
eurozone appear to conﬁrm that the UK is
better off outside the Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU). Yet this was not always
so. During the Labour term from 1997 to
2010, the ﬁve economic tests regarding the
UK and the euro were used to signal to the
EU that the UK was open to the idea of
adopting the euro—some day. The Labour
government continually claimed that the
UK’s ofﬁcial position remained unchanged
since being set out by the Chancellor in his
Statement to the House of Commons in
October 1997.
With the advent of a Conservative–Liberal
Democratic government under the leadership
of David Cameron in May 2010, this signal
was bound to change. The new government
had no intention of replacing the pound with
the euro (despite Deputy Prime Minister
Nick Clegg being openly in favour of the
UK joining the euro). Instead, Chancellor
George Osborne announced (to laughter) in
the House of Commons that he had
abolished the Treasury’s Euro Preparations
Unit. ‘Yes, one does exist, and the ofﬁcial
concerned has been redeployed to more pro-
ductive activities’, he said.1
The stability of the British euro-outsider
position in the EU was conﬁrmed, once
again, with the new settlement agreement,
which will take effect immediately if the UK
votes to remain in the EU. Large sections of
the agreement are dedicated to issuing guar-
antees that euro-outsiders are not obliged to
contribute to eurozone bailouts or participate
in a ﬁscal union. Thus the new settlement
agreement stresses that the UK is entitled
‘not to adopt the euro and therefore to keep
the British pound sterling as its currency’.2
However, a quick look at the UK and the
other euro-outsiders reveals that the position
outside the eurozone is not straightforward.
The euro crisis and the resulting intensiﬁca-
tion of eurozone cooperation have put the
UK and other euro-outsiders in a difﬁcult
position. As Jean-Claude Piris, former Direc-
tor General of the Council of the EU’s Legal
Service, puts it, ‘one of the consequences of
the euro crisis is that a “two-speed Europe”
is already establishing itself and strengthen-
ing, through the necessity for France,
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Germany and others to unite in order to
save the euro’.3 While euro-insiders will take
care not to exclude euro-outsiders in order
to safeguard the single market, eurozone
integration and further European integration
in economic affairs is inevitable as Europe
seeks to exit its crises.
How should euro-outsiders deal with the
integration dilemma? The dilemma involves
an uncomfortable choice between becoming
entrapped in the EU by surrendering substan-
tial political authority on the one hand and
being abandoned by the integration system
by insisting on preserving formal, state-based
sovereignty on the other.4 From this perspec-
tive the UK and (perhaps even more so) Den-
mark have, by virtue of their euro opt-outs,
moved along the continuum towards auton-
omy and away from inﬂuence. Interestingly,
the UK’s new settlement agreement in the EU
recognises the dilemma posed by the integra-
tion of the eurozone, but puts it as a problem
that can be solved ‘rationally’:
It is acknowledged that Member States not
participating in the further deepening of the
economic and monetary union will not create
obstacles to but facilitate such further deep-
ening while this process will, conversely,
respect the rights and competences of the
non-participating Member States.5
But how can euro-outsiders protect them-
selves from eurozone legislation and at the
same time ensure continued inﬂuence and
rights? This is not just a legal or institutional
question, it is a deeply political one.
The UK wants to ensure that euro-
outsiders are not at a disadvantage in terms
of economic governance. No one is against
that in principle. The problem is that there is
no agreement of what this means in practice.
When is a particular policy or decision only
in the eurozone interest and when does it
affect all EU member states? In December
2011, when David Cameron decided to
object to a revision of the EU treaties at the
European Council summit, which was to
include a ﬁscal compact only binding on the
eurozone, it came as a veritable shock to
both euro-insiders and -outsiders. How
could Britain refuse to be a member of the
euro club and still insist on shaping the rules
of the club?
For the German magazine Der Spiegel, it
marked the ‘Beginning of the end of Britain’s
EU membership’ as it put in the headline of
its online story. In Brussels and across Euro-
pean capitals, the British veto was seen as a
diplomatic and political mistake that would
further isolate the UK, because Cameron had
failed to acknowledge the importance (and
legitimacy) of eurozone integration. Yet, as
this article will show, the British strategy of
ﬁghting against eurozone integration is a
longstanding, but largely futile approach,
also used before the euro crisis.
This article is divided into three sections.
First, I look at how the British voter is pre-
sented with the issue of euro-outsiderness in
major British newspapers. I show that the
main focus is on the eurozone economic tur-
moil and its potential for recovery, but that
the UK’s ability to ensure continued inﬂu-
ence in the EU takes limited space. This, as I
show, is markedly different in the Danish
press, which is more focused on the political
consequences of euro-outsiderness for Dan-
ish inﬂuence on the EMU. Second, I analyse
how a two-speed Europe with increased
eurozone integration has affected the UK’s
position in the EU and that of other euro-
outsiders such as Denmark, Sweden and
Poland. I argue that they manage their posi-
tions differently and that the UK stands out
as the only member state that does not
accept that there is a trade-off between inﬂu-
ence and autonomy. Finally, I discuss the
prospects of further eurozone integration
and the effects of the UK’s possible exit from
the EU on the relationship between eurozone
insiders and outsiders.
The media coverage of euro-
outsiderness
How does the British voter understand the
UK’s position outside the eurozone? Interest-
ingly, most voters (at least those who read
the daily British newspapers) don’t really see
it. I have examined the media coverage for
the year 2015 in the following newspapers:
The Times, The Guardian, The Independent,
Daily Mail and Daily Mail on Sunday, The
Daily Mirror and Daily Mirror on Sunday.
Using the database LexisNexis, I searched
for the combination of the words ‘eurozone’
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and ‘UK’ across all articles, thereby covering
all pieces mentioning the eurozone and the
UK in this period. I then coded for whether
the articles portrayed the UK’s outsider
status as generally positive (understood as
good for the UK’s economy or politics), neg-
ative (understood as bad for the UK’s econ-
omy or politics) or neutral. Not surprisingly,
as Figure 1 shows, 46 per cent of the articles
depicted the outsider-status as beneﬁcial for
the UK whereas 29 per cent were neutral
and 25 per cent saw euro-outsiderness as
negative. It should be noted that because the
newspapers selected for the study exclude
The Sun and The Telegraph, the data is likely
to present a rather euro-friendly view of Bri-
tish media coverage. The full picture is likely
to be even more supportive of the UK being
out of the euro.
I then examined whether the articles
focused on the economic or the political
dimension of British euro-outsiderness.
Eighty-eight per cent of the articles focused
on the economy and only 10 per cent on Bri-
tish position and inﬂuence in relation to the
eurozone, and a mere 1 per cent were debat-
ing the broader political consequences the
UK’s euro-outsiderness, as can be seen in
Figure 2. Judging from the media coverage,
the British voter will not tend to think that
differentiated integration in the form of euro-
zone integration matters much.
The same cannot be said for the coverage
of euro-outsiderness in the Danish press. I
searched the major Danish newspapers
Berlingske, Politiken, BT, Børsen, Information,
Jyllands-Posten, Ekstra-Bladet and Weeken-
davisen with the same search codes for the
same year (2015). Here only 6 per cent were
concerned with inﬂuence and the Danish
position in the eurozone, 48 per cent were
about the eurozone economy. However,
what stands out in the Danish coverage of
euro-outsiderness is that 46 per cent were
debates and opinion pieces about Denmark’s
position in a two-speed Europe (see Fig-
ure 3). This high percentage of opinion-
related pieces has to do with the fact that
there was a referendum in December 2015
about Danish Justice and Home Affairs, nat-
urally leading to a higher focus on opinion
polls and voters’ views on EU-related issues.
What is striking is that in both countries
there is little attention to the question of
inﬂuence and positioning in the EU—that is,
consequences of euro-outsiderness get so
little attention at a time when eurozone
integration is so strong. It is all the more
striking, because euro-outsiders strive hard
to manage their positions in the EU.
Posive Negave Neutral
Figure 1: Newspaper coverage of UK euro-
outsiderness
Inﬂuence Economy Opinion Other
Figure 2: Newspaper coverage of UK euro-
outsiderness
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Voluntary and involuntary euro-
outsiders6
All euro outsiders are deeply concerned with
the eurozone’s multiple crises that began in
2009 and have been continuing with greater
or lesser intensity ever since—sovereign
debt, the banking crisis, and low competi-
tiveness and growth. Inﬂuential voices argue
the crises were exacerbated by the funda-
mental design faults of monetary integration.
Concerned about the very future of the euro-
zone, and also about being ‘infected’ if they
joined the group, most euro-outsiders have
adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach to the
euro, reﬂecting former UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair’s ‘prepare and decide’ policy.
While it does not get much coverage in
the British and Danish press, euro-outsiders
handle their positions outside the eurozone
very differently. The newer member states
have a treaty obligation to eventually adopt
the euro, although without a speciﬁc time-
table on when to do so. This is in contrast to
the UK and Denmark, which have formal
opt-outs and are thus not required to adopt
the euro. The 28 EU member states now fall
into one of three categories:
• eurozone members (the nineteen EU mem-
ber states that now share the euro);
• involuntary euro-outsiders (or pre-ins)
(those obligated to join EMU but not yet
able or ready to do it);
• voluntary euro-outsiders (those who do
not intend to join the eurozone).
For many years, members from Central and
Eastern Europe were determined to gain
entry to the euro area and were competing
to be the ﬁrst to enter the eurozone. The cri-
sis, however, changed this. Now most of the
Central and Eastern European members are
reluctant. Poland, for instance, was meant to
join in 2012 but was stopped by the crisis.
The Czech Republic is openly sceptical of the
wisdom of joining the euro and has been so
for many years, while other states such as
Bulgaria and Hungary have more recently
declared that they are in no hurry to join the
eurozone.
The position of the UK and Denmark
stands out in comparison with the other
member states that have yet to adopt the
euro. The UK and Denmark represent two
extremes in the euro-outsider continuum.
Denmark is the closest to joining the euro-
zone while the UK is the most staunch
euro-outsider. However, for a long period,
it remained uncertain whether the UK and
Denmark would eventually join the euro. It
was expected that all states would do
everything in their power to fulﬁl the con-
vergence criteria for introducing the euro,
and the British and Danish strategies gave
good reason to believe that they might one
day join. Not only did British ofﬁcials
engage actively in the negotiations on the
procedure for excessive deﬁcits but they
also took part in the preparatory commit-
tee’s lengthy discussions about the design
of the single currency coins and banknotes.
Still today, British and Danish ofﬁcials tend
to negotiate as if they were bound by the
same rules as the euro area. David Camer-
on’s veto of the treaty changes—which
would never fully apply to the UK—is just
one illustration.
As I have shown in my previous work,7
the euro area is not just a mode of coopera-
tion; it is a ‘family with a common destiny’,
as former European Central Bank (ECB)
President Jean-Claude Trichet likes to put it.
Indeed, the EMU has become one of the
Inﬂuence Economy Opinion
Figure 3: Newspaper coverage of Danish
euro-outsiderness
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important distinction markers in the EU.
Involuntary euro-outsiders are perceived as
being on their way to becoming good Euro-
peans. Contrary to the UK, the Danish gov-
ernment actually tried to abolish the euro
opt-out in 2000, thereby demonstrating a
genuine willingness to ‘join the club’. Den-
mark is bound to the euro area by its ﬁxed
exchange rate policy, and Danish ofﬁcials
see themselves as ‘the best euro country that
never was’. Since the Baltic states joined the
eurozone, only Denmark is in ERM II (the
current version of the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism). Participation in the ERM II is volun-
tary and the ﬂuctuation bands are +15
percent, with the possibility of individually
setting a narrower band with respect to the
euro
Contrary to the UK, Denmark has gener-
ally sought to be bound by as much euro-
zone legislation as possible or has bilaterally
adapted to EMU legislation. Danish ofﬁcials
are proud when Jean-Claude says that Den-
mark should count as a member of the euro
area in future statistics. However, there are
limits to the extent to which one can ‘play’
at being a real member. As one Danish ofﬁ-
cial explains, the Eurogroup represents a
closed club and rapprochement must be
credible:
As long as I can say that the political and
economic elite and the government is inter-
ested in participating, we appear positive;
but if it becomes too obvious that Denmark
does not intend to adopt the euro, I fear that
we will be perceived as Switzerland, which
enjoys the beneﬁts without paying the costs.
Switzerland, then, the EU-outsider, is seen as
an extreme case and evokes the image of the
free rider. When asked to describe the impli-
cations of the Danish euro opt-out, the stan-
dard answer from European Commission
ofﬁcials is: ‘Getting rid of the euro opt-out
would be a great step forward for Den-
mark’s image. Right now it is basically a
free-rider.’8 By ‘free-rider’, the Commission
ofﬁcial refers to the fact that the Danish cur-
rency (krone) is pegged to the euro and in
exchange for giving up monetary autonomy,
it has enjoyed a stable currency regime. The
UK, as we shall see, is less worried about
being seen as a free-rider. While this may
seem reasonable since the UK conducts an
independent monetary policy and is not part
of ERM II, the free-rider concept can be
applied more generally to the situation
where a state beneﬁts from the single mar-
ket, but does not commit fully to the ideas
of European integration and solidarity.
A growing zone of exclusion
Over the last two decades, the eurozone has
set up its own institutions (the euro summits
of the heads of state and governments, and
the ﬁnance ministers of the eurozone mem-
bers) and is moving towards a banking union
under the supervision of the ECB. In June
2015, the Five Presidents’ Report9 written by
the European Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker, together with the President
of the Euro Summit, Donald Tusk, the Presi-
dent of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem,
the President of the European Central
Bank, Mario Draghi, and the President of the
European Parliament, Martin Schulz, was
published. It presents ambitious plans to
move the eurozone towards a ﬁscal union,
with coordination and convergence of ﬁscal
policy, including some kind of ﬁscal capacity
to make transfers from more prosperous to
poorer countries within the eurozone. This
will also involve a further strengthening of
the Eurogroup and its presidency.
The formalisation of the Eurogroup—
where the ministers meet the day before the
ﬁnance ministers’ (ECOFIN) Council meeting
and not just in the hours before it—began in
2000. When Nicolas Sarkozy succeeded in
establishing summits exclusively for the
heads of state of the euro area, now for-
malised by the ﬁscal compact of 2012, he
was completing a process of separation that
had been evolving for over a decade.
Already in July 2000, the French presidency
introduced a routine whereby the Eurogroup
held longer meetings and could distinguish
euro-area issues from the ordinary agenda of
the ECOFIN Council.
But the Eurogroup is only the tip of the ice-
berg. A veritable ‘exclusion zone’ with a par-
allel system of meeting forums that only
include euro-insiders has been created. To
prepare the meetings in the Eurogroup, for
instance, an EFC working group has been
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established. With this exclusion zone being
replicated at all levels, the division between
euro-insiders and euro-outsiders has become
increasingly important. ECOFIN remains for-
mally responsible for making decisions, but
the informal Eurogroup has gradually
obtained a certain level of authority and for-
malisation and has expanded its agenda,
culminating with the Lisbon Treaty, which
consolidates the forum as the de facto engine
room of integration. The formalisation of the
Eurogroup was partly sought to get rid of
the bothersome British interventions. As one
European Commission ofﬁcial comments:
‘We do not want outsiders such as the UK to
use disagreement in the Eurogroup to make a
big mess, and this is why we expanded the
questions that are only dealt with by the euro
area. We also want them to feel frustrated.10
During the ﬁrst years of the Eurogroup’s
existence, its members primarily exchanged
views on the basis of economic forecasts
produced by the European Commission,
followed the budgetary situation of euro-
insiders, undertook monetary dialogue with
the ECB president, and discussed and anal-
ysed the exchange-rate developments of the
euro, and issues related to global imbalances
and the international use of the euro. The
group now issues speciﬁc advice on labour
market reform, product market reform and
ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, it debates over-
arching macroeconomic policy, as well as
international economic and energy policy.
Even climate and environmental issues are
discussed in the Eurogroup. Most recently,
the Five Presidents’ Report11 on the future of
the EMU suggests common standards in the
ﬁeld of labour markets, competitiveness,
business environment and public administra-
tion, as well as certain aspects of tax policy,
e.g. corporate tax base. Even if the report is
not implemented in full, as some of it is
quite controversial, it will further expand the
areas where euro-outsiders will be excluded
from substantial discussions about EU deci-
sions and legislation that will potentially also
affect euro-outsiders.
Of course, not all euro area initiatives are
deliberately crafted to exclude euro-outsiders.
Apart from strengthening cohesion among the
euro-insiders, the exclusion of euro-outsiders
also serves practical purposes. As new mem-
ber states join, formal decision-making forums
have continued to grow in size. With well over
150 people present in an ordinary ECOFIN
Council meeting, the scope for negotiations
and effective interaction has diminished signif-
icantly. This is why the parallel system is so
valuable. It stands to reason that it will only
become more difﬁcult to reach agreement with
the UK, Denmark and Sweden, as well as the
involuntary outsiders, all in one room.
In sum, decision-making is sliding from
ECOFIN into the Eurogroup, thereby conﬁrm-
ing the rubberstamp function of the ECOFIN
meetings, which are presented with decisions
as a fait accompli. Despite British protests, the
Lisbon Treaty (which came into force on 1
December 2009) recognises the Eurogroup as
an ofﬁcial EU institution—not just a private
dinner club—and it has the ability to set a for-
mal agenda for itself. This further strengthens
the division between insiders and outsiders.
Fighting exclusion
However, euro-outsiders have not passively
accepted their gradual exclusion. The estab-
lishment of the Eurogroup and the expan-
sion of exclusion zones have been severely
criticised by the UK, Poland and Sweden,
and Denmark to a lesser extent. Britain has
taken up the role of ﬁghting for the rights of
euro-outsiders and especially focusing on
securing the autonomy in economic and
ﬁnancial affairs of euro-outsiders. As
Cameron explained after the European
Council meeting in February 2016:
We have ensured that British taxpayers will
never be made to bail out countries in the
eurozone. We have made sure that the euro-
zone cannot act as a bloc to undermine the
integrity of the free trade single market. And
we have guaranteed that British business will
never face any discrimination for being out-
side the eurozone.
The UK is not totally alone. Poland insisted
on inclusion in the ﬁscal compact, winning
the battle against efforts to exclude non-
members led by France. The Czech Republic
joined the UK against plans to integrate the
ﬁscal compact in the existing treaty struc-
ture. But the euro-outsiders are generally
more subtle than the UK, uncomfortable
about being seen as destructive free-riders.
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As former Prime Minister of Denmark Helle
Thorning-Schmidt put it, Denmark should
be ‘as close to the core as possible’. Euro-
outsiders see variable geometry as inevita-
ble, but have generally tried to move the
eurozone towards a more inclusive mode.
This pragmatic position recognises that
choosing to opt out of the EMU comes at a
cost, but also that euro-outsiderness can be
managed in a way that still optimises
national interests.
British ofﬁcials often feel obliged to remind
their European colleagues of the UK’s status
as a full member state. They draw on a dis-
course about ‘fairness’. British ofﬁcials ﬁnd
exclusion unfair when the Eurogroup dis-
cusses issues that have implications beyond
the euro area. Needless to say, what consti-
tutes ‘implications beyond the euro area’ is
difﬁcult to agree upon. Even before the Euro-
group had been conceived, British diplomats
questioned the division between what they
called ‘ins’ and ‘outs’. They argued that it was
problematic if only the ‘ins’ had the right to
vote when decisions could materially affect
the ‘outs’. This struggle continues. British ofﬁ-
cials regularly challenge the division of labour
between the Eurogroup and ECOFIN:
We have always been clear that when it’s an
issue of economic importance to the EU as a
whole, then it should be rightfully discussed
in the ECOFIN Council. ECOFIN should be
the main decision-taking body, and the Euro-
group should not in any way impinge on
that.12
It is clear that the UK is deeply concerned
about its position as a euro-outsider. The
UK’s experience from the introduction of the
euro in 1999 to the ﬁscal compact in 2011
and beyond is not encouraging. Not surpris-
ingly, the other euro-outsiders adopt a con-
structive approach, including informal
information-sharing with euro-insiders such
as Finland, or arguing for observer status at
Eurogroup meetings and preparatory meet-
ings. Strategies of obstructing eurozone
integration to secure autonomy may be
successful at the outset but, in the long run,
it is a futile strategy. As concluded in a
Financial Times article published after Camer-
on’s 2011 veto: ‘Forcing the eurozone to set
up its own parallel union will not protect
the City . . . By precipitately wielding his
veto, Mr Cameron may well have hastened
the formation of such a bloc, to the detri-
ment of British interests.’13
The future of euro-outsiderness
The question facing all euro-outsiders
(whether they are supposed to join at some
point or remain permanently outside) is:
How strong will eurozone integration be in
the future? How deep will the integration
dilemma be felt? On the one hand, all EU
member states (euro-insiders and -outsiders)
have an interest in eurozone recovery and
consolidation, including the creation of better
rules and improved governance. George
Osborne and David Cameron have repeat-
edly advocated a full ﬁscal union for the
eurozone, to include ﬁrm ﬁscal rules for all
members of the eurozone. The consequences
of euro zone disintegration would severely
impact not just the eurozone, but also the
British economy. This understanding is also
reﬂected in the UK’s new settlement agree-
ment: ‘to fulﬁl the Treaties’ objective to
establish an economic and monetary union
whose currency is the euro, further deepen-
ing is needed’.14 All this is to help facilitate
and support the proper functioning of the
euro area and its long-term future, for the
beneﬁt of all member states.
On the other hand, the UK—and other
euro-outsiders such as Sweden and Denmark
—are worried about the creation of a euro-
zone bloc, a union within the union, which
would shape the rules of the game for the
entire EU, not just the eurozone. If more and
more decisions are taken among euro-
insiders, euro-outsiders will be increasingly
marginalised. Overall, euro-outsiders have a
common interest in making sure that the
eurozone countries do not make economic
decisions on behalf of the EU regarding the
single market without the involvement of the
non-euro states. This worry is not unfounded
as the above sections demonstrate.
However, there are at least three reasons
why the UK (and other euro-outsiders)
should not worry too much about further
eurozone integration.
First, as long as there are euro-outsiders,
the eurozone will have to stay relatively
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open to non-euro members. Because of the
involuntary outsiders, the eurozone is a mul-
ti-speed or differentiated system (the objec-
tives are shared but timeframes differ). A
large number of involuntary members are
obliged to join the eurozone. Therefore, not
only must the door remain open for any-
body wishing to join the inner circle of inte-
gration at a later stage, but the decisions and
instruments of enhanced integration should
not prejudge the rights of non-participants
in the broader context of the Union.
However, the likelihood of the euro-
outsiders joining the EMU has diminished in
recent years with an understanding of the
fundamental design faults of the EMU. For
instance, being a relatively large economy,
Poland has grown increasingly sceptical of
the EMU and of giving up independent
monetary and exchange rate policies. This
reduces the likelihood that Poland will be
interested in adopting the euro in the
coming years, but it remains legally obliged
to join at some point, which means that a
permanent split of the eurozone from the
rest of the EU cannot (yet) happen.
Second, eurozone members such as Ger-
many, Estonia and the Netherlands do not
want to alienate the euro-outsiders, as they
are determined to safeguard a liberal single
market and remove barriers to trade. Even
if the recommendations of the Five Presi-
dents’ Report15 are fully implemented, these
liberal insiders will continue to listen to
British concerns and wishes regarding the
single market. Within the eurozone, there
continues to be fundamental disagreement
over the balance between economic and
political governance in Europe, which has
only been intensiﬁed by the economic crisis.
This also helps to explain why German
Chancellor Angela Merkel has gone to great
lengths to accommodate British interests—it
could be argued that all eurozone members
have tried all they could to accommodate
Britain. Indeed, liberal hawks such as the
Netherlands and Finland need a British
voice in the EU to deepen the single mar-
ket, including on services, the digital market
and capital.
Third, there is substantial euro-scepticism
among euro-insiders, which dampens the
will to integrate. Marine Le Pen, leader of the
National Front in France, wants her country
to leave the euro, and in Germany the
Alternative for Germany is increasingly criti-
cal of economic and monetary integration.
Taken together, a deeper political and
institutional split between euro-insiders and
-outsiders will take some years to materi-
alise, leaving time for the UK to ﬁnd an opti-
mal position in the EU system—if a majority
of British voters vote to remain in the EU.
This will require a different strategy from
the one hitherto adopted by the UK, focus-
ing not as much on safeguards, but on inﬂu-
ence and voice in the single market.
Eurozone integration in itself is not a reason
for a euro-outsider to leave the EU.
However, should the UK decide to leave
the EU, it will have incalculable conse-
quences for Europe. For the eurozone, the
situation would also be complex. In an
ordered version of Brexit, it would lead to
further integration around the core of euro-
zone members, leaving remaining euro-outsi-
ders in a more marginalised and exposed
position than if the UK had remained a
member of the EU. This is part of the reason
why Denmark, Sweden and other euro-
outsiders fear the UK leaving the EU. A
more disordered Brexit could perhaps lead
to further disintegration of the EU with more
member states holding referendums and
choosing a looser coupling with the EU,
leading to a watered down EU and the
potential for eurozone disintegration, includ-
ing the dismantlement of EMU. Of course,
this is what Denmark, Sweden and other
euro-outsiders, as well as euro-insiders, fear
even more.
Conclusion
This article has focused on the management
of differentiated integration, and in particu-
lar how the UK and other euro-outsiders
manage their euro-outsiderness. The division
between euro-insiders and euro-outsiders
has become the central mode of differentia-
tion in the EU. Choosing not to adopt the
single currency is not just a decision about
keeping monetary sovereignty; it is about
where one stands in the integration process
per se. I have argued that there are huge
differences between voluntary and involun-
tary euro-outsiders and that they have dif-
ferent ways of dealing with their euro-
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outsiderness and the dilemmas and con-
straints involved.
Euro-outsiders react differently to exclu-
sion. Of course, it makes a great difference
how the opt-out is designed in the ﬁrst place.
The UK has a ‘complete’ opt-out, while
Denmark manages an opt-out which could be
seen as largely symbolic and Poland is in
between. Beyond formalities, the differences
stem in how euro-outsiderness is handled
from different national dispositions in
addressing the integration dilemma between
autonomy on one hand and inﬂuence on the
other. For the UK, euro-outsiderness
contributes to the idea that it requires special
treatment. For other euro-outsiders, opting
out is seen as a more pragmatic choice that
naturally comes with some costs. Euro-
outsiders such as Denmark work hard to be
as close to the core as possible.
A club requires commitment from its
members. Contrary to assumptions in media
coverage and political discourse, differenti-
ated integration is not straightforward.
One of the striking aspects of British euro-
outsiderness is that its management largely
takes place below the radar of public
attention. Thus, contrary to voters in other
euro-outsider states, British voters are
presented with euro-outsiderness as merely
a pragmatic solution. When David Cameron
vetoed treaty changes in December 2011 that
would have allowed the ﬁscal compact to be
part of the treaties (albeit only binding on
the euro countries), Foreign Secretary
William Hague said: ‘Within the European
Union there are different groups of countries
that cooperate on different subjects. Some
are in the euro and some aren’t.’16 This may
be true, but the UK will not escape the
dilemma between inﬂuence and autonomy,
even if it chooses to leave the EU.
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